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Application of African Customary Law: 




Historically, African customary law has occupied the lower rungs of the legal 
ladder, often being set aside for more formal laws. This is primarily due to the 
introduction of western and religious legal systems through the exploration of 
western nations into Africa, missionary activity and, subsequently, colonisation. 
However, African countries – including Kenya – are making an effort to give 
due recognition to customary law. This paper discusses the steady degradation of 
customary law from the colonial period to the promulgation of the Constitution 
of Kenya 2010 where there are attempts to resuscitate its application,  it also 
discusses the challenges that the courts may face in this application of customary 
law today and possible solutions to these challenges.
I. Introduction
In traditional African society, men from the same geographical area came 
together and formed tribes. These tribes formulated laws based on customs and 
beliefs for the common good. These customs applied exclusively to members 
of  a specific community equivalent to the jurisdiction of  the law in modern day. 
These laws and customs are now referred to as African customary law.1
During the pre-colonial period, traditional African communities adjudicat-
ed over any disputes in the community using their own customary law derived 
from the customs and societal norms of  the time. These communities embraced 
* The author is a student at the Strathmore University Law School in Nairobi, Kenya.
1 http://www.kenyalawresourcecenter.org/2011/07/genesis-of-african-customary-law.html#sthash.
ZfUkWDHe.dpuf  on 11 September 2015.
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restorative values in resolving conflicts and in responding to wrongdoing. Civil 
and penal practices in these communities embraced restorative justice as under-
stood today. Restorative justice can be defined as ‘processes whereby parties with 
a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath 
of  the offence and its implications in the future.’2 It was fundamental as people 
did not exist as individuals but more as part of  a community. Their entire lives 
were built on a web of  societal relationships which had to be maintained as they 
formed part of  that community.3 African customary law always emphasised the 
welfare of  the community over the individual and thus the individual was forced 
to make decisions for the betterment of  the community. The Xhosa community 
of  South Africa believed in ubuntu which translates to ‘I am because we are.’4 
Another interpretation is ‘I am human because I belong to the human commu-
nity and I view and treat others accordingly.’5 In Kenya, the Kikuyu community 
granted rights of  use of  land to individuals according to their need whether the 
grantee had a right to control that land or not.6
Basically, traditional African communities used a justice system that was 
akin to the one used today. Parties were allowed to argue their case and present 
evidence before a number of  adjudicators. Punishment or justice was meted out 
to the wrongdoer once guilt was ascertained. The only differences perhaps are 
that punishment was restorative as opposed to retributive and the verdicts did 
not hinge on argument but truth. Customary law and social norms were applied 
in adjudication with different communities applying their own specific laws and 
norms much like the jurisdictional use of  law today.7
While Kenyan law does not formally define customary law, it is implic-
itly recognised in the constitution under Article 159(3).8 The Interpretation and 
General Clauses Ordinance of  Tanzania gives the following definition: ‘Any rule 
or body of  rules whereby rights and duties are acquired or imposed established 
2 Marshall T, Restorative justice: an overview (1999), <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/
occ-resjus.pdf> on 29 August 2015. See also Braithwaite J, ‘Survey Article: Repentance Rituals and 
Restorative Justice’, The Journal of  Political Philosophy (2000), 115.
3 Kinyanjui S, ‘Restorative justice in traditional pre-colonial ‘criminal justice systems’ in Kenya’ Tribal 
Law Journal (2009), 4.
4 https://2012spiritinaction.wordpress.com/2013/04/18/ubuntu-in-the-xhosa-culture-means-i-am-
because-we-are/> on 23 November 2015.
5 http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/Cities/Publication/BookCoE20-Chaplin.pdf  
on 24 November 2015.
6 http://www.fao.org/docrep/u8995e/u8995e06.htm on 23 November 2015.
7 The Akamba community of  Eastern Kenya was used as a case study for this assertion in Kinyanjui 
S, ‘Restorative Justice in Traditional Pre-colonial ‘Criminal Justice Systems’ in Kenya’, 6.
8 Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
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by usage in any Tanganyika African community and accepted by such community 
in general as having the force of  law.’9 Part I of  this paper discusses the degrada-
tion of  customary law from the time Kenya was declared a protectorate in 1895 
to the promulgation of  the 2010 Constitution. Part II discusses the challenges 
that the courts and the legal system have faced in the application of  customary 
law and finally, Part III will provide possible solutions to these problems.
II. The Degradation of African Customary Law in Kenya
From the age of  discovery in the 15th century to the colonisation of  Af-
rican states in the 20th, African customary law was degraded to pave way for 
modern models of  law. This can be attributed to the introduction of  western-
ised legal systems by the European settlers and of  religious systems such as 
Christianity and Islam that had their own specific sets of  laws. The introduc-
tion of  canon law by the missionaries led to conversion of  tribesmen from 
their indigenous law.10 Throughout the time of  missionary activity from 1844, 
when Kenya became a protectorate in 1895 and was finally declared a colony 
in 1920, customary law was used but not recognised as part of  the country’s 
legal system. Finally, with the imposition of  the British judicial system during 
the colonial period and its subsequent continuation under the Kenya national 
government, authority for handling the more serious crimes was given to the 
police and courts.11
III. The Colonial Era (1895-1963)12
When Kenya was declared a protectorate in 1895, the British settlers were 
few in number and lacked sufficient resources to impose direct rule. Instead, 
9 http://www.kenyalawresourcecenter.org/2011/07/genesis-of-african-customary-law.html#sthash.
ZfUkWDHe.dpuf  on 11 September 2015.
10 The first missionary in Africa is claimed to be George Schmidt who arrived in Table Bay, South Africa 
in 1737. He established a mission station for the KhoiKhoi. In 1742, he baptised five Khoikhoi. 
They were the first indigenous African people to be converted to Christianity, South African history 
online <http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/first-missionary-arrives-cape> on 5 September 
2015. 
11 Harkness S, Edwards C, Super C, ‘Social roles and moral reasoning: a case study in a rural African 
community’ Developmental Psychology (1981), 596.
12 This section discusses law from 1895 which was the year that Kenya became a protectorate, as 
opposed to 1920 when she became a colony; even in 1895, laws other than customary law were being 
applied by the settlers.
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they sought to exercise authority over the already established traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms.13 As early as 1897, the British administration formally 
recognised certain indigenous agents of  dispute settlement by granting jurisdic-
tion to existing ‘courts’ of  local chiefs and councils of  elders. Although avow-
edly based on traditional institutions, these systems were an integral part of  the 
unitary judicial system of  the Colony.14 Formal dispute resolution systems such 
as courts and tribunals were also introduced. These formal systems, however, 
only applied to Europeans and Indians15 while Muslims were subject to Islamic 
law.16 African customary law applied to all Africans17 irrespective of  conversion 
to another religion. In Benjawa Jembe v Priscilla Nyondo,18 J Barth held that African 
customary law was applicable to the estate of  an African who had abandoned the 
customs and become a Christian. This universal African application did little for 
the status of  customary law. In R v Amkeyo19 the question that arose during trial 
was whether a woman married under African customary law could testify against 
her husband. The common law deemed a husband and wife as one person and 
neither could be compelled to give evidence against the other. According to CJ 
Hamilton, a wife married under African customary law was not a legal wife or 
spouse under the formal law. Consequently, the court compelled her to give evi-
dence against her husband. This case is indicative of  how African customary law 
was degraded to the bottom of  the legal food chain and made way for judicial 
precedence, ordinances and statutes.
In an ordinance to amend the Court’s Ordinance20 these disparate bodies 
were reorganised into several hundred native tribunals, each consisting of  as 
many as fifty or more elders. These, like their predecessors and successors, 
were instructed to apply ‘the native law and custom prevailing in the area of  the 
jurisdiction of  the tribunal.’21 The elders were presumed to know this customary 
law as an integral part of  their inherited tradition, a reasonable presumption since 
13 Article 2(b), Native Courts Regulations Ordinance, (1897).
14 Section 2(b), Native Courts Regulations. (No. 52 of  1897). See Phillips, ‘Report on Native Tribunals 
(1945) 7-10.
15 Article 57, Native Courts Regulation Ordinance (this law was applied by the Mudirs and from 1907, the 
Liwali Courts).
16 Article 52, Order-In-Council (1897).
17 Ndulo M, ‘African customary law, customs and women’s rights’ Cornell Law Faculty Publications (2011), 
22.
18 [1912] 4 EALR 160.
19 [1917] 7 EALR 14.
20 Ordinance No.2 of  1930.
21 Abel R, ‘Customary law of  wrongs in Kenya: an essay in research method’ Faculty Scholarship Series 
(1969), 587.
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they were men of  little formal education, had few European contacts, and served 
exclusively within their own tribe.22 These native tribunals dealt with personal 
matters, customary crimes specific to a certain ethnic group and crimes under 
statute.23 However, these tribunals were not considered proper courts and thus 
were not part of  the nation’s legal system. In Lolkilite ole Ndinoni v Netwala ole 
Nebele24 the East African Court of  Appeal dealt with two matters relating to the 
Maasai customary practice of  blood money and the ability of  Native Tribunals to 
apply the Limitation Ordinance of  1934. The appellant’s father, who was deceased 
at the time of  the case, had allegedly committed homicide and the matter was 
taken to the Native Tribunal. However, the claim for blood money was made 
at the native tribunal thirty-five years after the alleged homicide. The Tribunal 
dismissed the suit but the Supreme Court awarded the claim. The Appellant 
appealed to the East African Court of  Appeal (EACA). The EACA dismissed 
the claim on the ground that it was repugnant to justice and morality to bring a 
matter for hearing after 35 years. It is clear that the EACA considered claims for 
blood money valid but rejected bringing the matter after a long period. Despite 
the ruling that indirectly supported the claim for blood money, Sir Edward CJ 
(Uganda) held that the Native Tribunals were not courts in the proper sense 
and therefore the Limitation Ordinance of  1934 was not applicable to them. 
The finding that the Native Tribunals were not proper courts, illustrates that 
Europeans attitude towards customary dispute resolution methods inferior to 
formal courts.25
The native tribunals were replaced in 1951 by the African Court in the 
African Courts Ordinance.26
IV. From independence (1963) to the New Constitution (2010)
Before the enactment of  the Magistrates Courts Act in 1967, the African 
courts applied customary law when dealing with personal or civil matters. These 
22 Abel R, ‘Customary law of  wrongs in Kenya: an essay in research method’, 613.
23 Kosele African Court Criminal Case no 33 of  1966 (the accused was charged with indecent assault 
contrary to Section 144 of  the Penal Code and convicted for breaking the virginity of  his victim and 
he was ordered by the court to compensate the victim with a heifer as per customary laws).
24 [1952] 19 EACA.
25 Kariuki F, Customary law jurisprudence from Kenyan courts: implications for traditional justice 
systems’ (2015) http://www.strathmore.edu/sdrc/uploads/documents/books andArticles/
TDRM%20and%20Jurisprudence.pdf. on 8 October 2015.
26 No. 65 of  1951.
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courts fused principles of  a fair hearing as known today, including the right to 
a public hearing, the right to an impartial tribunal, and the right to present evi-
dence, the right to an effective remedy27 among others while also respecting the 
customary law of  the area that the court was situated in a tribunal, the right to 
present evidence, among others while also respecting the customary law of  the 
area that the court was situated in.
In African courts, every man was his own advocate.28 A party could bring 
a claim for tortious actions like defamation and assault. Accusing someone of  
witchcraft with the intention to lead others to believe so was classified as defa-
mation.29 Defamation had to be a statement made with the intention to defame 
and not just vulgar abuse uttered during a quarrel.30
Compensation ranged from livestock and money,31 following a schedule 
of  compensation. For example, among the Kikuyu bodily injuries like the loss 
of  an eye solicited amounts ranging from ten to sixty goats; for loss of  a tooth, 
from one sheep to ten goats and a ram.32 In the Kisii community, a woman could 
file for divorce if  she had been assaulted by her husband or he had practised 
or forced her to practice witchcraft.33 After filing for divorce, she could ask the 
court to order her husband to return any of  her property that he retained. In 
Ukambani, if  a man struck a corpse, he was liable for full blood money. This 
method of  remedy satisfied the right to an effective remedy as victims were 
compensated for their losses.
27 http://www.achpr.org/instruments/principles-guidelines-right-fair-trial/ on 6 December 2015.
28 Thiong’o, N, The River Between’ African Writer’s Series, Nairobi, 1965 (The main character, Waiyaki, 
has to defend himself  on the charge of  betraying the tribe before the council of  elders and the 
members of  the tribe, signifying that trials were open to the public much like court proceedings 
today).
29 Kisumu DAC CC 299/66 (1966). (In this case, a wife -when confronted with rumours of  the death 
of  her son- accused her neighbour of  witchcraft and alleged that his witchcraft was the cause, but 
the boy turned out to be alive and the court stated that the woman defamed her neighbour with her 
unfounded claims).
30 Kisii DAC CC 47/66 (1966) (plaintiff  alleged that defendant had called her an adulteress, and 
claimed 200/- compensation; the court dismissed her claim as based on mere vulgar abuse uttered 
during a quarrel). See also the above case, Kisumu DAC CC 299/66 (where the plaintiff  also alleged 
that the woman also called him a tenant of  the land of  others and demanded compensation for 
this statement. The court held that the statement was merely an insult and could not be classified as 
defamatory).
31 Kisii DAC CC 64/66 (1966) (100/- compensation awarded against defendant on his admission that 
he had called plaintiff  a witch who had killed his child).
32 DAC CC 342/66 as cited by Abel, R, in ‘Customary law of  wrongs in Kenya: an essay in research 
method’, 612.
33 Kisii DAC CC 342/66 (1966) (a woman claimed for divorce after her husband shaved her hair and 
took her underwear to perform a “spell” on her).
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A number of  evidentiary rules were applied: e.g., taking of  testimony, exam-
ination, cross-examination, admittance of  exhibits and corroboration. In Kisii, 
on October 5th 1966, for instance, a woman filed for divorce on the grounds that 
her husband and her mother-in-law practised and tried to compel her to practise 
witchcraft. She gave testimony and the judges examined her, asking her questions 
about the types of  practices her husband engaged in. She was also required to 
produce evidence of  the same. She showed the court her shaved head (the Kisii 
believed that hair could be used to cast a ‘spell’ on its owner) and her underwear 
that was taken from her mother’s homestead.34
In 1967, the Magistrates Courts Act35 gave District Magistrates power to hear 
claims under African customary law. District Magistrates had jurisdiction all over 
Kenya and they effectively eliminated all African Courts in an attempt to unify 
the different laws governing the country. Section 2 of  the Act limited the cus-
tomary claims under the law to matters of  land, intestacy, family, seduction of  
unmarried women and girls, enticement of  married women to adultery and status 
of  women and children. In Virginia Edith Wambui v Joash Ochieng Ougo and Omolo 
Siranga36 a dispute arose over the place of  burial of  S.M Otieno who died intes-
tate. His widow wanted to bury him in Ngong while his clan wished to have him 
buried in his ancestral home. Both the High Court and the Court of  Appeal held 
that an African man could only be buried according to the customs of  the com-
munity since he could not completely disassociate himself  from the customs and 
practices of  his tribe. In Re Ogola Estates37 the testator drew a will that did not 
cater for his customary wife and the court held that this wife was not a wife for 
purposes of  succession. These are a few examples where the court used custom-
ary law before 2010. Most of  these cases fall within the scope of  section 2 of  the 
Magistrates Courts Act.
Effectively, courts only applied customary law as a guide in cases where 
written laws expressly provided for its usage. In Kamanza s/o Chiwaya v Manza 
w/o Tsuma,38 the High Court held that the list of  claims under section 2 of  the 
Magistrate Court Act was exhaustive and therefore barred customary law claims 
based on tort or contract. Claims based on tort and contracts were not included 
in section 2 of  the Magistrates Courts Act. 
34 Abel R, ‘Customary law of  wrongs in Kenya: an essay in research method’, 612.
35 Cap 10, Laws of  Kenya.
36 [1982-88]1 KAR.
37 [1978]KLR.
38 Unreported High Court Civil Appeal No. 6 of  1970.
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The above cases are a reflection of  how the elimination of  the African 
courts eroded the already slippery standing of  customary law in Kenya’s legal 
system.
V. The Deliberate Resuscitation of African Customary Law in Kenya
Article 159 (2) (c) of  the Constitution of  Kenya provides that courts are to 
be guided by the principles of  traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. Article 
159 (3) limits the application of  traditional dispute resolution mechanisms by stat-
ing that they should not be used in a manner that contravenes the Bill of  Rights, is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or other written laws or is repugnant to justice 
and morality or results in outcomes that are repugnant to justice and morality. 
Section 3 of  the Judicature Act states that the court can only apply customary 
law in a dispute provided that it is not repugnant to justice. This gives the court 
the discretion to determine which customs are unjust and which are not. In doing 
so, the courts assess whether a certain practice is detrimental to the physical and 
emotional wellbeing of  a person and also use laws from other states to determine 
what actions are repugnant to justice. In exercising this discretion, the courts may 
deem a custom as repugnant to justice and morality without fully evaluating the 
consequences of  illegalising the custom. In Katet Nchoe and Nalangu Sekut v R,39 the 
High Court held that the Maasai custom of  circumcising females was repugnant 
to justice and morality. The courts disregarded the customs and practices of  the 
Maasai and held that since female genital mutilation caused physical pain, it was 
repugnant to justice and morality based on the fact that this practice is harmful 
to the physical and social wellbeing of  a citizen. The decision seems rational and 
well-informed but a further analysis makes it fall to pieces. The decision is unjust 
to uncircumcised Maasai women who are shunned by their male counterparts be-
cause of  being uncircumcised. It does not answer the question whether the courts 
will compel Maasai men to marry their uncircumcised women.40
Kenyan courts are constitutionally empowered to use traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms when resolving an issue. Article 159 (2) (c) of  the consti-
tution provides that courts are to be guided by the principles of  traditional dis-
pute resolution mechanisms. Article 159 (3) limits the application of  traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms by stating that they should not be used in a man-
39 Criminal Appeal No. 115 of  2010 consolidated with Criminal Appeal No. 117 of  2010.
40 Kariuki F, Customary law jurisprudence from Kenyan courts: implications for traditional justice 
systems’, 7.
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ner that contravenes the Bill of  Rights, is inconsistent with the constitution or 
other written laws or is repugnant to justice and morality or results in outcomes 
that are repugnant to justice and morality. Despite this limitation, it is still worth 
noting that the introduction of  the use of  traditional dispute resolution methods 
is a step up for customary law. From Article 159 (1) it is clear that judicial author-
ity is derived from the people and is vested in and exercised by courts and tribu-
nals established under the constitution. In exercise of  that authority, the courts 
and tribunals are to ensure that justice is done to all, is not delayed and that it 
is administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities.41 Recognition 
of  ADR and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms is thus predicated on 
these cardinal principles to ensure that everyone has access to justice (whether 
in courts or in other informal fora), and that disputes are to be resolved expedi-
tiously and without undue regard to procedural hurdles that bedevil the court 
system as they are very informal.42 It also proceeds from the recognition of  the 
diverse cultures of  the various communities in Kenya as the foundation of  the 
nation and cumulative civilization of  the Kenyan people and nation.43 Most of  
these mechanisms are entwined within the cultures of  most Kenyan communi-
ties which are also protected by the constitution under Article 11.
 In the case of  R v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed,44 Abdow Mohamed was 
charged for the murder of  Osman Ali Abdi on October 19th 2011 in Eastleigh. 
On the date of  the trial, the prosecution made an application to court to mark 
the matter settled, based on Islamic laws and customs. The prosecution claimed 
that the accused’s family had paid compensation to the deceased family in the 
form of  camels, goats, and performed rituals. The rituals were a form of  blood 
money given to the deceased’s family. Further, the prosecution claimed that wit-
nesses to the murder were not willing to testify and therefore they could not 
proceed with the case. The court upheld the application of  the traditional dispute 
resolution system based on Article 159 and Article 157 of  the Constitution of  
Kenya that allowed the Director of  Public Prosecution to withdraw cases with 
the leave of  the court. This is a reflection of  the widening scope of  traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms into criminal law.
41 Muigua K, ‘Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms under Article 159 of  the Constitution of  
Kenya’ (2010)http://www.kmco.co.ke/attachments/Article/107/A%20PAPER%20ON%20
ADR%20AND%20ARTICLE%20159%20OF%20CONSTITUTION.pdf  on 7 December 2015.
42 Muigua K, ‘Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms under Article 159 of  the Constitution of  
Kenya’, 6.
43 Article 11, Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
44 [2013] eKLR.
Lisa Owino
152 Strathmore Law Review, January 2016
Apart from diverting cases from the criminal justice system by the use of  
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, an emerging jurisprudence from the 
court entails awarding compensation for offences based on customary law.45 In R 
v Lenaas Lenchura46 J Emukule sentenced Lenaas Lenchura using customary laws 
on conviction of  manslaughter. Lenchura, a World War II veteran, stabbed the 
deceased, after a dispute arose between the two on who would fetch water first. 
The deceased was 55 years while the accused was 89 years at the time of  the fight 
and stabbing. After a plea bargain, the accused’s charge of  murder was reduced 
to manslaughter and he pleaded guilty. The prosecution argued that the court 
should take into account the fact that the accused was a first offender as well 
as the circumstances under which he killed the deceased. The accused’s counsel 
submitted that water was a scarce resource in Samburu, a resource that carried 
the importance of  life and death, and that the court should consider this. Due to 
the accused’s advanced age and the inability of  the government to provide water, 
a duty imposed on it by the constitution, J Emukule resorted to the customary 
laws of  the accused. He sentenced the accused to five years suspended sentence 
and required him to pay compensation of  one female camel to the family of  the 
deceased according to their customs.
The application of  traditional dispute resolution methods also enhances 
the citizens’ access to justice. They entail the use of  practices and customs of  a 
community in resolving disputes. They form part of  the cultural norms, values 
and traditions of  a particular community. Thus, traditional disputes resolution 
mechanisms (TDRMs) are firmly embedded in the customary laws of  a tribe 
or ethnic group. Consequently, the success of  TDRMs in enhancing access to 
justice is pegged on the role and recognition of  customary laws as a significant 
source of  law.47
The 2010 Constitution championed the application of  customary law by 
providing for the application of  TDRMs, widening its scope to resolving dis-
putes in criminal cases and the awarding of  compensation. However, there are 
still numerous challenges that need to be addressed before the application of  
customary law can be ameliorated. For instance, the extent of  the repugnancy 
clause is yet to be fully defined. Despite the fact that law is striving to right the 
45 Kariuki F, Customary law jurisprudence from Kenyan courts: implications for traditional justice 
systems’, 10.
46 Criminal Case No.19 of  2011.
47 Kariuki F, ‘Applicability of  traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in criminal cases in Kenya: 
case study of  Republic v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed [2013] eKLR’, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Journal Vol.2 Issue 1 (2014).
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legislative wrongs that caused the deterioration of  customary law, there are still 
difficulties that need to be tackled.
VI. Challenges Facing African Customary Law
Today, the application of  customary law by courts in pluralist jurisdictions 
presents at least two issues. It would be remiss to assume that the application 
of  customary law in the courts both now and in the future is not fraught with 
difficulties. African societies have developed vastly since the pre-colonial period 
while customary law has not. Its unwritten nature, lack of  precedence, inherent 
favouritism of  the male gender, etc, are definite contributions to its lack of  pli-
ability in modern legal systems.
i. Unwritten nature and lack of precedence
In Kenya, courts apply the Constitution, Acts of  Parliament, Common Law 
and the doctrines of  Equity as per the Judicature Act.48 The 2010 Constitution in-
cludes customary law but limits it providing that it is not repugnant to justice and 
morality.49 This lack of  formalisation can be attributed to the difficulty in estab-
lishing a particular customary law. This is mainly because (unlike state law, which 
tends to be uniform, and relatively stable, and is issued formally and publicized) 
customary law in African jurisdictions is diverse and ‘remains largely unwritten, 
informal, and often difficult to ascertain.’50 Furthermore, the lack of  recorded 
precedence from recognised courts as opposed to informal traditional systems 
disqualifies the use of  customary law as common law. 
It is also the reason for the introduction of  foreign legal systems since its 
unwritten character led to the belief  that traditional African communities did not 
have any laws. These well-established legal systems overtook customary law and 
were applied by the colonialists, and as discussed above, degraded customary law. 
This slow abasement led to the lack of  recognition of  customary law as a formal 
law and thus, to the need to prove a customary law in evidence. In Ernest Kin-
yanjui Kimani v Muiru Gikanga and Another,51 the court held that where customary 
law was not notorious or written, the party relying on it must prove it in court. 
48 Section 3, Judicature Act (Act no 14 of  1977). 
49 Article 159(3), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
50 Juma L, ‘Putting old wine in new wine skins, the customary code of  Lerotholi and justice 
administration in Lesotho’, in Fenrich J, The Future of  African Customary Law (2011), 129-130.
51 [1965] EA 735. 
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This rule further undermined the standing of  customary law as the constitution, 
statutes, common law and equity are taken judicial notice of.52
While most legal professionals are conversant with the intricacies of  the 
constitution, statutes and common law, judicial training for customary law is 
limited. The court needs to call in experts to verify customs and, with chang-
ing times, these experts may become fewer and far in between. This situation 
becomes direr in light of  the fact that customary cases have no comprehensive 
precedent. When cases in native courts are concluded, the judge would deliver 
the judgment without explaining the rationale behind it. Thus there is little to 
learn from face-value reading if  native cases. Rules, however, may be elicited 
from the entirety of  a case but this still does not reveal the reasoning behind 
certain traditional practices.
As a result, customary laws must be pleaded as part of  the facts.53 It should 
be noted that this rule can be explained by the fact that most customs and prac-
tices may be known by members of  that community alone and cannot be easily 
verified if  they are unwritten or unknown. It is unworthy of  the court to blindly 
accept an uninformed position. A practice, just like any other material fact in a 
case, should be proved. Perhaps, in this assumption lies the challenge of  its un-
written nature. Though the need to prove customary law as a fact is logical, it is 
moot for its formalisation as it severely undermines its status as a recognised law.
ii. Repugnancy clause
In the words of  Ngugi wa Thiong’o: ‘If  we want to turn Africa into a new 
Europe. . . then let us leave the destiny of  our countries to Europeans. They will 
know how to do it better than the most gifted among us.’54 The colonial powers 
encountered problems in the attempt to create a unified legal system as mani-
fested by the presence of  different races in Kenya with conflicting ideas about a 
desirable legal system.55 As described above, the colonialists chose to implement 
the British legal system, African customary law and Islamic law in tandem with 
52 Kariuki F, ‘Customary law jurisprudence from Kenyan courts: implications for traditional justice 
systems’, 8.
53 http://www.kenyalawresourcecenter.org/2011/07/ascertainment-and-prove-of-customary.html on 
4 September 2015.
54 Thiong’o N ‘In the name of  the mother: reflections of  a writer and his empire’ James Currey Publishers, 
Suffolk, 2013, 25.
55 Ghai Y.P and McAuslan J ‘Public law and political change in Kenya’ Oxford University Press, London, 
1970, 125.
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the British legal system having the more formal laws. The introduction of  an ex-
traneous law into Kenya is not sufficient to explain this conflict of  law. However, 
the implementation of  more than one legal system in the same jurisdiction is the 
likely cause.56
After Independence, there was need to settle this internal conflict of  laws 
and the Judicature Act was passed along with its inclusion of  the repugnancy 
clause. This Act, however, did not solve the conflict of  law as the issue was not 
the morality of57 or the ability to achieve justice using customary law, but how 
to harmonise the different legal systems. Even now, with the promulgation of  
the 2010 Constitution of  Kenya, customary law is provided for in the Judicature 
Act58 which stipulates that it is to guide all courts in civil matters provided that 
it is not repugnant to justice.59 The repugnancy clause has been in application 
since colonial times60 and its application has not been clearly defined since. To 
define the specific terms of  the clause, that is, its justice and morality,61 would be 
inadequate as even the meanings of  these two words themselves must be taken 
within the context of  a specific circumstance surrounding a law.
There is a clear need to define the scope of  the clause as the position now is 
that the court has the discretion to determine whether a certain custom or practice 
is repugnant to justice. This is an unsatisfying application as the court may view 
a practice in the abstract sense and consequently, may adjudicate without regard 
to the consequences of  illegalising a certain practice.62 In Maria Gisege Angoi v 
Macella Nyomenda,63 the court was faced with the question whether a woman-to-
woman marriage custom among the Kisii was repugnant to justice and morality. 
A woman-to-woman marriage is a customary practice where a woman whose 
husband is dead “marries” another woman and chooses a male figure from her 
husband’s clan to sire children for the dead husband. The High Court held that 
56 McDowell M, ‘Review of  Antony Allot in ‘New essays in African law’ Cambridge University Press 
(1971), 102.
57 Opiyo A, ‘Repugnancy clause s.3[2] judicature act, cap.8 of  the laws of  Kenya: a critical examination 
of  the concepts of  justice and morality’ LLB Dissertation, University of  Nairobi, October 1993, 7.
58 Cap. 8, Laws of  Kenya
59 (This is reiterated in the Constitution), Article 159(3) Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
60 Article 52, Order-In-Council (1891).
61 Justice is defined as the quality of  being just; righteousness,  equitableness,  or moral rightness 
at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/justice on 8 December 2015, morality is defined as 
conformity to the rules of  right conduct; moral or virtuous conductathttp://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/morality?s=t on 8 December 2015.
62 Kariuki F, ‘Customary law jurisprudence from Kenyan courts: implications for traditional justice 
systems’, 10.
63 Civil Appeal No.1 of  1981.
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the practice was repugnant to justice and morality since it prevented the other 
woman from freely choosing whom to marry. Thus, there was no marriage. The 
decision did not take into account the circumstances of  the local community 
and the intention underlying the practice. With changing times, the court is more 
likely to adapt its decision based on the societal norm of  the time. This means 
that practices that fit under the terms of  the repugnancy clause today may be 
deemed illegal and immoral in a few years’ time.64 This clearly shows the need to 
define the specific or, at the very least, more specific purview of  the application 
of  the repugnancy clause.
iii. Jurisdictional Issues
Customary law, like any other law, has its equivalent of  jurisdiction. It ap-
plies only to the members of  its specific community. In the colonial period, Afri-
can customary law was only applied when the parties were both Africans but that 
position changed with section 3 of  the Judicature Act which states: 
‘The High Court and all subordinate courts shall be guided by African customary law 
in civil cases in which one or more of  the parties is subject to it or affected by it, so 
far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with 
any written law, and shall decide all such cases according to substantial justice without 
undue regard to technicalities of  procedure and without undue delay.’
This provision opened up the application of  customary law in cases where 
one of  the parties was a non-African but does not give guidance as to the cir-
cumstances when customary law can be applied to a non-African. Some scholars 
opine that the implication appears to be that where a non-African has dealt with 
an African in a transaction where it was clearly intended that customary law 
should apply the non-African should not escape the consequences of  the appli-
cation of  customary law merely because he is not an African.65
In the case of  a conflict in a transaction between two members of  different 
Kenyan tribes clearly intending the application of  customary law, it is unclear as 
to what specific tribal law will be used. In the circumstances of  marriage or child 
custody, it is less complicated since in most traditional Kenyan communities the 
wife adopts the customs of  the husband and thus his tribe’s customary law will 
govern any conflict. Such a situation is more complicated in the case of  criminal 
64 Wambui Otieno v Joash Ochieng Ougo and Omolo Siranga (1982-88)1 KAR (the court acknowledged that 
the day of  reckoning for the burial practices of  the Luo was fast approaching).
65 Harvey W, Introduction to legal system in East Africa, East Africa Literature Bureau, Kampala, 1975.
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law (which TDRMs are slowly penetrating). In the case of  R v Mohamed Abdow 
Mohamed,66 Abdow Mohamed was charged for the murder of  Osman Ali Abdi 
on October 19th 2011in Eastleigh. On the date of  the trial, the prosecution made 
an application to court to mark the matter settled based on Islamic laws and cus-
toms. The prosecution claimed that the accused’s family had paid compensation 
to the deceased family in the form of  camels, goats, and performed rituals. The 
rituals were a form of  blood money to the deceased’s family. If  the victim and 
the murderer in the aforementioned case were not of  the same tribe, then apply-
ing TDRMs would be more taxing because of  the uncertainty of  which tribe’s 
customary law to apply.
It is arguable that the law of  the victim and his or her family should be 
applied. In general statement, the customary law of  the person affected by the 
transaction should be applied. Consider the case of  Virginia Otieno v Ougo & 
another:67 the court directed that the deceased be buried in accordance with the 
customs of  his Luo clan and stated that there is no way in which an African citi-
zen can divest himself  of  association with the tribe of  his father. Mr Otieno, hav-
ing been born and bred a Luo, remained a member of  Luo tribe and subject to 
the customary law of  the Luo people. In this circumstance, the person affected 
by the transaction was the deceased as it involved his burial place.
Traditionally, different tribes have different customs and laws thus it is dif-
ficult to pinpoint characteristics of  law. Indigenous customary laws were not uni-
form: there were points of  similarity which cut across ethnic groupings, but there 
were also enormous differences in structure of  the laws and contents. These 
variations were brought about by different stages of  economic and political de-
velopment, different social and kinship systems or different religious beliefs and 
different cultural practices of  the society.68 Although it is considerably easier to 
adjudicate according to the customary law of  the region, the lack of  area-based 
African courts brings the enormity and diversity of  customary laws to the fore-
front.
66 [2013] eKLR.
67 {1987} KLR 371.
68 http://www.kenyalawresourcecenter.org/2011/07/african-customary-law-under-reception.
html#sthash.SGXv8N4w.dpuf  on 24 August 2015.
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iv. Legal Pluralism
Legal pluralism is a key feature of  African legal systems.69 The form of  
pluralism that permeates these systems derives from what is known as the prin-
ciple of  “legal centrism”, which holds that all law emanates from the state and 
that rites developed and practiced by non-state actors, including religious and 
customary institutions, are law only to the extent that they are recognized by the 
state.70 This feature is evident in the Kenyan legal context from the repugnancy 
clause which provides that customary law can only be applied in so far as it is 
consistent with written law and not repugnant to justice.71 Article 159 (2) (c) of  
the Constitution of  Kenya provides that courts are to be guided by the principles 
of  traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. Article 159 (3) limits the applica-
tion of  traditional dispute resolution mechanisms by stating that they should 
not be used in a manner that contravenes the Bill of  Rights, is inconsistent with 
the constitution or other written laws or is repugnant to justice and morality or 
results in outcomes that are repugnant to justice and morality. 
Recall the earlier discussion on how the colonialists applied customary law 
and formal law beside one another. This dual application of  law can be credited 
as the beginning of  pluralism in the Kenyan legal system. The amalgamation of  
foreign laws with indigenous laws often elicits opportunities for challenges and 
conflicts in interpretation and enforcement of  the laws in many African soci-
eties.72 Article 159(3) of  the Constitution of  Kenya states that TDRMs can only 
be applied if  they are consistent with the Constitution, written law and the Bill of  
Rights. Article 50 (2) (p) states that an accused person in Kenya has the benefit 
of  the least severe of  the prescribed punishments for an offence. The use of  the 
word ‘prescribed punishment’ again may be interpreted to mean that the same 
should be in written form and thus exclude the application of  traditional crimi-
nal justice. These constitutional provisions lead to the inference that traditional 
justice systems are mostly intended for use in civil cases as mirrored by section 
3(2) of  the Judicature Act.73
69 Frémont J, ‘Legal pluralism, customary law and human rights in francophone African countries’ 40 
Victoria University of  Wellington Law Review (2009-2010), 149.
70 Griffiths J,  ‘What is legal pluralism’ Journal of  Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (1986), 1.
71 Section 3(2), the Judicature Act, Cap 8, Laws of  Kenya. 
72 Ige R A, ‘Legal pluralism in Africa: challenges, conflicts and adaptation in a global village’ Journal of  
Law, Policy and Globalisation Volume 34 (2015).
73 Tobiko K, The relationship between formal rule of  law and local traditional justice mechanisms, the 
18th International Association of  Prosecutors Annual Conference, Moscow, 8-12 September 2013 
available online.
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On the ground, however, more Kenyans prefer to use traditional justice sys-
tems due to inadequate accessibility and the capacity gaps of  the formal justice 
system. Thus, the former continues to be applied informally in criminal offences. 
In R v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed,74 the parties settled the dispute out of  court 
and refused to attend court when the Director of  Public Prosecutions refused 
to withdraw the prosecution. The prosecution was later withdrawn for lack of  
evidence. This situation presents a disparity between the formal law that only al-
lows the application of  traditional dispute resolution methods in minor criminal 
cases75 and the practice in communities. There is also a discrepancy between 
customary resolutions and international standards. In some communities, minors 
can be married off,76 which contravenes the international principle of  the best 
interest of  the child being paramount in all actions.77 The challenge most ignited 
by legal pluralism is the scope of  the more informal laws. To what extent should 
customary law apply in civil and more so, criminal cases? The constitutional and 
written provisions need to be reflected in the practice on the ground.
v.	 Difficulty	of	Application	in	Modern	Situations
Customary law or, more accurately, all the different customary laws of  the 
tribes in Kenya, was formed on the basis of  different societal norms and cus-
toms than today. Due to changing times, the legal system cannot reproduce the 
circumstances or context that these social norms operated in and by which they 
were enforced. Thus, the legal system has a creative function which is creates a 
new type of  customary law that can be applied in today’s context.78
Customary law is slow to establish and slow to adapt to modern situations. 
For example: it would be hard to adapt customary law to encompass or to govern 
cases on corporate law, intellectual property law or, especially, offshore drilling 
rights cases.79 This is a huge impediment as law is not limited to family, succes-
sion, property and criminal cases. It extends far beyond this, to apply to the 
increasingly capitalistic society that Kenya is today. It would hardly be reasonable 
to adapt customary law to govern legal or business ethics. In as much as the law 
74 [2013] eKLR.
75 Section 176, Criminal Procedure Code (Rev. 2012).
76 Tobiko K, The relationship between formal rule of  law and local traditional justice mechanisms, 14.
77 UNHCR Guidelines on Formal Determination of  the Best Interests of  the Child, 3 May 2008, 13.
78 Woodman G’ How state courts create customary laws in Ghana and Nigeria’ People’s Law and State 
Law: the Bellagio Papers (1987), 182.
79 <http://www.quora.com/What-are-the-advantages-and-disadvantages-of-customary-law> on 3 
September 2015.
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limits the application of  customary law, customary law in itself  applies to a lim-
ited number of  modern scenarios.
vi. Discrimination
The Kenyan Constitution protects all minority classes in Kenya from dis-
crimination and accords them equal benefit and equal protection of  the law.80 
This constitutional provision is paramount over all others as the constitution 
is the supreme law of  the land. However, many women continue to suffer dis-
crimination under customary systems that are favored by the rural population in 
Kenya. Instances of  widows being dispossessed of  their late spouses’ property, 
wives being disadvantaged during divorce proceedings and women in cohabita-
tion relationships not being recognised as legitimate spouses are not uncommon.
In Kenya, there is an intricate link between customary laws, customary 
practices and women’s rights. Almost invariably, women occupy a disadvantaged 
position under customary law. This is because traditional African societies are 
governed on the basis of  patriarchal structures where women’s individual in-
terests were subsumed under the interests of  the group. Hence customary law 
contains aspects that often run counter to principles of  gender equality and non-
discrimination espoused in both domestic and international human rights instru-
ments. The continued application of  customary law in areas such as succession 
and marriage engenders conflict with statutory provisions.81 Despite the equal 
inheritance provisions in the Law of  Succession Act, it is unclear whether these pro-
visions are actually being practised on the ground when using customary dispute 
resolution systems.
This raises conflicting issues about the extent of  application of  custom-
ary law in succession matters. While some courts have insisted on the exclusive 
applicability of  the Law of  Succession Act, other courts have maintained that 
customary law is generally applicable in succession matters, even where there is 
no express provision for it in the Act.82 Under this approach, customary law has 
been applied to deny women the right to inherit their father’s or husband’s estate, 
as happened in Mary Gichuru v Esther Gachuhi.83 In contrast, in Mbinga v Mbinga,84 
80 Article 27, Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
81 Kamau W, ‘Customary law and women’s rights in Kenya’ at http://theequalityeffect.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/CustomaryLawAndWomensRightsInKenya.pdf  on 8 December 2015.
82 Kamau W, ‘Customary law and women’s rights in Kenya’, 17.
83 Civil Appeal No. 76 of  1998.
84 [2006] eKLR.
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Lady Justice Khaminwa appealed to the principles of  non-discrimination en-
shrined in international treaties to which Kenya is a signatory, namely the Univer-
sal Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR) and Convention on the Elimination 
of  All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to override a cus-
tomary law that allowed discrimination against married daughters in inheritance 
matters. In a bold articulation of  gender equality, the judge noted that the custom 
of  disinheriting daughters went against the current jurisprudence in international 
law which was making a concerted effort to ensure that there was no discrimina-
tion on the ground of  gender.85
These conflicting court positions make it difficult for future applicators of  
customary law to decide what position should be taken. On top of  the contrast-
ing positions, most customary systems will opt to use their own customs and 
norms to adjudicate disputes and may be rightly backed by the former case. How-
ever, this position is contrary to a number of  international treaties that Kenya 
has ratified and which now form part of  the State’s law. Suffice it to say, applying 
customary law can be challenging in some situations as it fosters discrimination 
against women and falls short of  international standards.
VII. Possible Solutions 
The attitude of  Kenya’s legal system towards customary law is improving 
from its post-independence attitude. This is especially clear from the application 
of  the aforementioned TDRMs applied by the court and the recognition of  cus-
tomary land rights and land-holding systems. Despite these improvements, there 
is still need to ensure that its usage is effective and promotes justice.
Firstly, greater respect should be accorded to customary law and traditional 
institutions. The preamble of  the Swazi Constitution86 states that it is necessary to 
blend customary institutions with those of  democratic society, and then the Con-
stitution sets out the traditional pillars of  the monarchy and states that traditional 
government is administered according to Swazi law and custom.87 Micronesian 
law requires all court decisions to be consistent with the customs and traditions 
of  Micronesia.88 The stated positions may not work effectively in Kenya as there 
is a great diversity of  customs due to the large number of  tribes. However, sepa-
85 Kamau W, ‘Customary law and women’s rights in Kenya’, 17.
86 Preamble, Constitution of  the Kingdom of  Swaziland (2005).
87 Section 227, Constitution of  the Kingdom of  Swaziland (2005).
88 Article XI section 11, Constitution of  the Federated States of  Micronesia (1975). 
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rate traditional institutions may be established or tribes may be represented in 
established government institutions. At face value, the latter option may seem 
to exacerbate the already-rampant problem of  tribalism in government institu-
tions thus interfering with their integrity. The choice of  electing parliamentarians 
and government officials is mostly based on tribe making the addition of  more 
tribal elements to government redundant and even more, detrimental to the con-
fidence of  the people in the government. The former is a viable option as seen 
in Botswana where the law provides for a House of  Chiefs, which submits reso-
lutions to the National Assembly on Bills affecting customary issues.89 If  even 
establishing separate traditional institutions seems taxing, then more respect and 
involvement should be accorded to the present traditional institutions like the 
Njuri Ncheke, the Nabongo and other traditional administration bodies in the mak-
ing of  laws, especially laws that affect customs and communal land.
Kenya can borrow a leaf  from other African countries and establish courts 
with specific jurisdiction over customary law.90 The courts lack adequate knowl-
edge and usually depend on the opinion of  experts and the use of  assessors. 
Most Kenyans are of  indigenous Kenyan origin and thus subject to the customs 
of  their tribe. No African can divorce himself  from the tribe of  his roots and 
thus he will always be under his tribe’s law ‘…there is no way an African citizen of  
Kenya can divest himself  of  the association with the tribe of  his father...’91 This 
carries the implication that the majority of  Kenyans filing claims in courts are 
party to a certain customary law and thus it is applicable in most cases. Therefore, 
establishment of  customary courts, not unlike the native courts and tribunals of  
pre-independence Kenya or the African Courts of  post 1951, may foster a more 
effective resolution of  disputes using customary law. Customary courts may also 
prove to be faster, more easily accessible and cost-effective in promoting access 
to justice.92 However, if  established, these courts should be given the same status 
and validity as other courts in Kenya. Establishment of  these courts is advanta-
geous as precedence can be built from the customary cases providing a way for 
the courts and the people to gain knowledge of  customary law for posterity. 
Customary elders can be educated on the national and international hu-
man rights’ standards fostering non-discrimination in customary dispute resolu-
89 Sections 77 and 85, Constitution of  Botswana (1966).
90 Article 78(5), Constitution of  the Federal Democratic Republic of  Ethiopia (1995); section 110(3), Constitution 
of  the Republic of  Malawi (1994); sections 265, 280, Constitution of  the Federal Republic of  Nigeria (1999).
91 Wambui Otieno v Joash Ochieng Ougo and Omolo Siranga (1982-88)1 KAR.
92 Article 48, the Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
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tion.  A Kenyan NGO,  KELIN, developed an alternative approach for accessing 
justice for widows and their children who had been disinherited. Working with 
customary legal structures in Homa Bay and Kisumu, on the shores of  Lake 
Victoria, KELIN helped rebuild community-based justice systems so that they 
respect Kenyan law and human rights. KELIN held community dialogues with 
widows, elders, and government officials to get their suggestions for the project. 
They then conducted trainings for elders and widows on the human rights provi-
sions of  Kenyan property and inheritance laws. Customary structures now are 
more equipped to address inheritance disputes.  KELIN has taken on more than 
100 cases involving disinheritance, the vast majority of  which have been resolved 
with women and children back on their land. Cases adjudicated in this way take 
much less time than in the formal courts; an average of  three months to resolve, 
compared to the average three years for court cases.93
Wider application of  customary law can be applied if  there was more com-
prehensive knowledge on customary law. As stated above, establishment of  cus-
tomary courts can lead to the building of  precedence of  customary cases. On 
top of  this, judges, lawyers and future law students should be taught customary 
law formally much as they are taught common law principles and doctrines of  
equity. This task is quite daunting considering the fact that there are many diverse 
customs and an expert in every tribe for most tribes may be required for an ac-
curate understanding of  norms. The most reliable experts are traditionalists and 
they may not be adequately instucted to teach the legal aspect and implications 
of  customary law. This perhaps is the most glaring challenge that can arise from 
the formal teaching of  customary law.
Most of  the suggestions above are riddled with challenges arising from the 
unwritten and diverse nature of  customary law. Application of  any one of  the 
following suggestions may, however, help effect another, for example: establish-
ing customary courts will help build a body of  precedent that may then be used 
for the formal teaching of  customary law. Effecting one of  these or even other 
solutions is vital as it will expose customary law to public attention, anchoring it 
more firmly in Kenya’s legal system.
93 http://www.endvawnow.org/en/Articles/762-addressing-customary-laws-and-practices-that-
conflict-with-formal-laws.html on 10 December 2015.
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VIII. Conclusion
All great change in any state begins from the court. Just as a court ruled for 
the possession of  human chattels legalising slavery94 and more recently, legalised 
gay marriage,95 the proper application of  and emphasis accorded to customary 
law should continue to evolve from the court. It seems as if  the answer to law 
in an African context lies somewhere other than in the application of  a system 
premised on and designed for the western principles of  individualism and capi-
talism. It cannot be repeated often enough that a legal system must reflect the 
people it serves if  it is to gain their confidence. Clearly, the answer lies not in 
mimicking a western model of  law but in accommodating different systems of  
law informed by the need to respect the right of  communities to observe cultures 
and customs which they hold dear and to preserve customary law. This is the 
steel that will forge a better society true to its African identity.
94 Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (the plaintiff  sued the defendant after she refused to let him 
purchase his and his family’s freedom. The Supreme Court held that the state had no authority to 
interfere with how an owner uses his chattels).
95 Obergefell v Hodges (2015) (heard in the Supreme Court where the court stated that all states nationwide 
were required to legalise gay marriage).
